In this paper we look at the relationship between crime and economic incentives in a different way to other work in this area. We look at changes in unemployment benefits and the imposition of benefit sanctions as a means of studying the way that people on the margins of crime may react to economic incentives. The paper relies on a quasiexperimental setting induced by the introduction of the Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) in the UK in October 1996. We look at crime rates in areas more and less affected by the policy change before and after JSA introduction. In the areas more affected by the tougher benefit regime crime rose by more. These were also the areas with higher outflows from unemployment and particularly to people dropping off the register but not into work, education/training or onto other benefits. Areas that had more sanctioned individuals also experienced higher crime rates after the introduction of JSA. As such the benefit cuts and sanctions embodied in the JSA appear to have induced individuals previously on the margins to engage in crime. Thus there appears to have been an unintended policy consequence, associated with the benefit reform, namely higher crime.
Economic models of criminal behaviour postulate that economic incentives matter for people's decisions on whether or not to partake in crime (Becker, 1968 , Ehrlich, 1973 , 1996 . These could be monetary incentives generated by changes in the relative return to crime versus legitimate activities, or incentives generated by changes in the nature of the criminal justice system.
From an empirical standpoint the economic model of crime has had some success.
In his survey piece on the economics of crime, Freeman (1999) states that 'most empirical evidence supports the role of incentives in the criminal decision' [Freeman, 1999, p.3530] . But a huge amount of effort has been devoted to looking for connections between crime and unemployment, the evidence on which Freeman (1999) says is fragile at best. A smaller body of work considers links between crime and low wages (Gould, Mustard and Weinberg, 2002 , Grogger, 1998 , Machin and Meghir, 2004 . Here more of a consensus has been reached and low wages do seem to be significantly associated with crime. Other work shows that sanctions that increase deterrence do act to reduce crime and there is a large body of criminological evidence on this (Nagin, 1998) .
In this paper we take a different approach to look at how economic incentives can affect crime. Our approach is firmly grounded in theory recognising that, at its most basic, the economic model of crime (as in Becker, 1968 , or Ehrlich, 1973 , (1-u)E + ub, p, S). In this simple framework an increase (decrease) in b will result in a fall (rise) in crime.
Rather than following much of the literature by looking at the relationship between crime and unemployment, we study links between crime and economic incentives in a different way to other work in the literature by focusing on what happens to crime when unemployment benefits are cut, or sanctions are imposed. We consider this in a quasi-experimental setting where benefit cuts resulted from a government policy change designed to clamp down on benefit recipients by toughening the conditions for benefit receipt.
The policy we study is the introduction of the Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA) to the UK labour market in October 1996. JSA introduction was justified as a simplification of the complex unemployment benefit system and brought in a much more stringent, tougher regime. It brought about major changes to the entitlement to those benefits and introduced sanctions through a tightening of the monitoring of job search activities. The duration of non means-tested contributory benefits was reduced from 12 to 6 months and jobseekers were more closely monitored as rules were "changed to enable benefit to be stopped where the unemployed person's behaviour is such that it actively militates against finding work" ( HMSO, 1994) . Overall JSA introduction resulted in a general toughening and tightening of the benefit regimes.
We frame our empirical analysis by asking what happened to crime in areas that were more affected by the JSA introduction as compared to those that were less affected.
We therefore implement a difference-in-difference estimator of the impact of the policy introduction. Further, we assess the robustness of our results to looking at earlier time periods. This is important since results from our analysis of what happened to crime before and after JSA introduction would be spurious if the same relationship held in 3 earlier (non-policy intervention) time periods as well. We also consider possible longer run effects looking at benefit sanctions in the twenty five quarters after JSA introduction.
Our research approach of using a policy intervention to generate exogenous variations can also be justified from another related, but somewhat different, perspective.
Over the years a large amount of academic research has tried to evaluate the impact of government policy interventions on economic and social outcomes. Less work has considered how such policy interventions may spill over and affect other outcomes that are not explicit targets of the policy itself. In particular it may be that some policies do significantly impact on the policy variable of interest (unemployment in the case of JSA), but nonetheless may have effects (positive or negative) on other outcomes (like crime) as a direct result of the policy intervention.
The focus on benefit cuts and sanctions is of particular interest due to the large literature on the impact of changes in unemployment benefits on unemployment rates and durations (see Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991, and Manning, 1999) . In this literature one focus is on whether benefit cuts do help in getting people back into work. Our analysis suggests that even if such a policy has the desired impact on unemployment rates there could be a downside if people leave the unemployed stock but do not go into work (or education, training or other benefits). If benefit sanctions move people off benefits and their income falls this may impact on crime, resulting in an unintended consequence of the government policy intervention. Thus, despite our focus on a particular UK benefit reform, our findings are potentially of general applicability and relevance to welfare to work programmes the world over.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the JSA and its introduction, discusses the data we use and presents some descriptive analysis.
Section 3 discusses the empirical model, presents estimates of the cross-area associations 4 between changes in crime and JSA introduction and presents a discussion of some related work of a more qualitative nature. Section 4 concludes.
The Jobseeker's Allowance and Data Description
The Jobseeker's Allowance
The Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA) was a new benefit for unemployed people introduced in the UK on 7 October 1996. It replaced both Unemployment Benefit (UB)
and Income Support (IS) by consolidating these two benefits into a single one. It also established more stringent, stricter job seeking rules linked to entitlement to address the government's concern that "there is still a common misunderstanding that people qualify for benefit by virtue of only being unemployed and not by what they are doing to find work" (HMSO, 1994) . The policy halved the length of eligibility based benefit on National Insurance contributions from twelve to six months. This change was implemented on 7 April 1996 so that it would take effect with the introduction of JSA six months later. We use this reform to define a claimant population that is at risk of facing benefit cuts or sanctions.
The introduction of contributory JSA also implied a reduction in income for unemployed claimants who would have been previously entitled to UB. First, contributory JSA was now based on the old IS rate of benefits which gives lower benefit income compared to the old UB rate. As a result contribution based benefits for unemployed people aged under 25 were cut from £48.25 to £37.90 per week (corresponding to a percentage reduction of 21%). Second, under contributory JSA the possibility to claim an extra £29.75 weekly for an adult dependent was no longer available. Thus the benefit income of a young unemployed person with enough NI 5 contributions and an adult dependent would be more than 50 percent lower under the new system as compared to the old.
Benefit entitlement was also tightened with the introduction of a new set of rules intensifying the monitoring of job search activities. Claimants have to enter the Jobseeker's Agreement when they first sign on and, if the agreement is not fulfilled, benefit sanctions are imposed. Benefits could also be cut for two to four weeks under the JSA if a claimant failed to attend a government programme aimed at enhancing employability. In addition, a sanctioned individual was no longer automatically entitled to hardship payment if otherwise entitled to income based unemployment benefit. Proof of the household "suffering hardship" as a result of the sanction would now be required.
One should also recognise that there have been many reforms to the UK benefit system over time (see Table 11 .2 in Van Reenen, 2004) . However, the period when JSA was introduced was actually a relatively quiet period in terms of reform, where there were no other policy changes taking place at or around the same time. This is important for the research design we adopt in that we would not want our effects to be confounded by other policy changes that occurred at the same time. For example, this would be a problem if one wanted to look at benefit reform changes contained in the New Deal programme that occurred later on in the 1990s (Van Reenen, 2004) .
JSA and Crime Data
The main source of data on JSA is the JUVOS (Joint Unemployment and (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973) but many commentators would argue that violent crimes are much less likely (if at all) to be shaped by monetary factors. Our view is that this is essentially an unresolved issue and one can put forward arguments both ways. 3 As such we choose to present empirical models of violent crime as well.
Measuring the Effect of JSA Introduction
Turning to the JSA data, the outflow from the claimant count in a given quarter was divided by the stock of claimants in the previous quarter to give a measure of the outflow rate. Between October and December 1996 this outflow rate stood at 14.7
percent. This compares to an average of 11.9 percent in the four preceding quarters. This is a first indication of a JSA 'effect' on unemployment flows.
Certain categories of claimants were more affected by the benefit policy overhaul than others. As noted above, the most 'at risk' group are those recipients who reached the new six rather than twelve month benefit cut off point in the October-December 1996 quarter when JSA was implemented. With the JUVOS data we can easily identify the group of claimants who were unemployed for three months at the start of the previous quarter (i.e. July). Dividing this population by the total unemployed stock in the same quarter gives us a measure of the proportion of at risk claimants.
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If this measure picks up the impact of JSA we should see a bigger increase in outflows before and after JSA introduction in areas with more at risk claimants in the quarter before introduction. This gives us a quasi-experimental setting much like that often used in the minimum wage literature where the proportion of workers beneath the minimum wage in the period before a minimum wage increase is used to identify the potential beneficiaries (Card, 1992; Machin, Manning and Rahman, 2003) . Like the minimum wage literature it is, however, crucial that we analyse whether the pre-policy proportion is correlated with the variable of interest, in this case the outflow rate from unemployment. Why should this matter for crime and criminality? A natural response would be that JSA type sanctions will reduce unemployment and that the people affected would exit the claimant count to employment. However, when one examines the destination of those who flow off the count it is not obvious that this is the case. For example, a research summary on JSA by Rayner et al (2000) states that 'the initial increase in 3 For example, Grogger (2000) presents a model of violent crime where economic incentives matter. 9 movements off benefit was due to a 'weeding out' of those who were not previously assiduous in their job search or were claiming fraudulently ' [p. 7] .
Unfortunately a destination variable was only recorded in the JUVOS Cohort from September 1996 although it exists in national level data from as early as January 1995 (Sweeney, 1998) . The Office for National Statistics kindly agreed to provide us with the earlier dataset containing destination information and postal districts for geographical identification. Consequently we are able to analyse the effect of the introduction of JSA on outflows to different destinations.
The destination data provides a large number of reasons for claim terminations.
These can be aggregated into two broad categories. The first is mostly composed of claimants leaving the count that have found work, enrolled in full time education or training, or moved to other benefits. The second comprises those who withdrew their claim, or failed to sign in at the job centre. The former group could be referred to as unemployed claimants whose outflow is to 'somewhere' while the latter outflow is to 'nowhere'. We are not implying that the 'nowhere' destination cannot be into employment or any other legitimate activity. We can nevertheless use this information to see if JSA induced a shift in the destinations of the outflows. We are particularly interested in whether the flow to 'nowhere' relative to 'somewhere' moved pre-and post-JSA introduction. Indeed there appears to be an increase, with the percent of the outflow going to nowhere being an average of 20.5 percent in the four quarters preceding JSA introduction. This jumps to 23.8 percent in the quarter after introduction. In this section we consider whether areas where JSA introduction had a greater impact differ in their evolution of crime rates before and after the policy change. We begin with a largely descriptive analysis and then turn to statistical difference-indifference models.
Descriptive Analysis Table 1 summarises crime rates in the quarters before and after JSA introduction for four groups of areas, categorised by how much they were likely to be affected by JSA introduction. To do this we rank areas by the at risk population variable discussed above and then split them into four groups; as 'Highest at risk JSA' through to 'Lowest at risk JSA'. The precise area groupings are given in the notes to the Table. The relation with both property and violent crime rates is clear. Crime rises significantly in the 'Highest at risk JSA' areas after JSA introduction. Comparison of the change in crime rates before and after JSA between the 'Highest at risk JSA' and the 'Lowest at risk JSA' areas gives a difference-in-difference estimate of the impact of JSA on crime. This is given in bold in the Table. For both property and violent crime there is a significant positive estimate. This is borne out for the before and after changes shown in Figure 2 . In areas that have more unemployed claimants with at risk durations in the quarter pre JSA introduction, property crime rates rose by more. The relationship is strongly significant (coefficient = 2.99 with associated standard error of 0.72). As such the descriptive analysis uncovers a significant positive association between JSA introduction and crime.
Basic Statistical Results From Quarters Surrounding JSA Introduction
A more formal statistical analysis is carried out in Table 2. The Table reports reduced and structural form estimates of the crime-JSA relation. The first two columns 11 are reduced form regressions of the change in crime rates on the pre-introduction at risk population of the form:
(1) ∆log(C at ) = α + βJSA a,t-1 + γ∆X at + e at where C is the crime rate in area a in quarter t, JSA is the pre-JSA introduction at risk
proportion, e is a random error and X denotes a set of demographic controls included so as to ensure that any correlation between crime changes and the initial at risk proportion is not due to compositional changes occurring at the same time as JSA introduction.
The Table reports two sets of estimates of equation (1). The first (specifications (1) and (7)) is a simple regression of the change in crime on the initial period proportion excluding the control variables and so is simply the slope of the regression lines fitted through the data points given in Figure 2 . The second (specifications (2) and (8)) adds in the controls. 4 It is evident that inclusion of these controls does not much affect the estimated JSA impact which remains positive and significant and, in fact, actually rises when they are added.
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The last four columns report estimates from the structural model where the change in crime is related to the change in the outflow rate, O at , for area a in year t:
where ε is a random error.
The first stage regression is:
with error term ξ.
The identification of an outflow rate effect on crime comes from the notion that the at risk proportion only affects crime through changes in the outflow rate induced by 12 the JSA introduction. This seems plausible in that the JSA policy change differentially affected outflows for particular duration groups and that, over and above working through increased outflows, one should not see any direct effect of this at risk duration group on crime. As one will see below, there is absolutely no evidence of a direct association between crime changes and the at risk proportion in earlier non-policy time periods. The only significant relationship between the changes in the outflow rate and the initial at risk proportion occurs in the quarters surrounding JSA introduction.
The first stage change in outflow regression without controls is simply the regression slope from Figure 1 , which is reproduced in columns (3) and (9) of the Table. This estimate is not affected much by the inclusion of the controls, as the coefficient on JSA falls only moderately, from 1.84 to 1.63. These regressions reconfirm that the group more affected by JSA introduction were, as hypothesised, significantly more likely to flow from the claimant register once JSA was introduced.
The final two columns of the Table show (5) it is the ratio of coefficients from specifications (1) and (3) (i.e. 2.99 / 1.84) or more generally it is β/λ from equations (1) and (3) above. 6 There seems to be strong evidence that the areas which were more affected by JSA introduction were also those with bigger increases in outflow rates and, in turn, those with the biggest increases in crime. These effects are present for both property and violent crime.
Destination Differences
We established earlier that outflows to 'nowhere' rose between pre-and post-JSA introduction periods. This is in line with the notion that the benefit clampdown implicit in JSA moved more people off the register, but not into employment, training or other benefits. We are interested in whether the increased flow to 'nowhere' was associated with higher crime.
Table 3 looks at differences in the outflow rate destination defined as the relative outflow to nowhere as compared to the outflow to somewhere. We term this the difference in outflow rate destinations. The Table is of the same structure as for the structural model in Table 2 . A strong and significant JSA effect on crime emerges in the Instrumental Variable specifications (3), (4), (7) and (8). This is true irrespective of whether one includes controls or not. This gives us confidence that the relationship is being driven by the increased flows to 'nowhere'.
Results Benchmarked Against Earlier Non-Policy Introduction Quarters
The results so far point to relative crime increases in areas where a greater proportion of workers were likely to be affected by JSA introduction. This is strongly suggestive of links between crime and benefit cuts and sanctions. But what if the same links existed in periods before JSA introduction? Our finding would turn out to be spurious if the same kind of link did exist. Indeed were it the case that crime rates also rose in relative terms by a similar magnitude in areas with more people in the at risk duration categories in time periods when the JSA was not present, then our results could not be attributed to the introduction of JSA.
To rule out this possibility and ensure we are identifying changes resulting from JSA introduction we need to look at models specified in the same way as those already 14 considered for earlier time periods. Thus, Table 4 shows a set of results from regressions that benchmark the results against the relationship between changes in crime and the initial at risk proportion in earlier time periods. As these add a further differenced set of data, in the control periods where there was no JSA policy, one can think of these estimates as triple differenced, or difference-in-difference-in-difference estimates.
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The basic crime reduced form specification now becomes:
(4) ∆log(C at ) = α + β JSA a,t-1 + β P I(t>τ)* JSA a,t-1 + γ ∆X at + γ P I(t>τ)∆X at + ε at where I(t>τ) is an indicator function taking the value 1 for the period after policy introduction (at time τ) and 0 for the pre-policy periods (t<τ). The key parameter of interest is now β P , where the P denotes the policy on period. Table 4 reports the β P coefficients on the initial at risk proportion in the policy on period. The coefficients reported in the first column of the Table make it clear that our earlier estimates are not picking up a relationship that existed in earlier time periods. For both property and violent crimes the estimate of β P is significant and positive, showing the effect from the at risk proportion to be more significantly positive in the period surrounding JSA introduction than in the comparison periods. 8 The same is true when the control variables are added in specifications (2) and (5) in Table 4 .
The fact that there is only an association between changes in crime and the at risk proportion in the policy on period is shown in Figure 3 . The Figure shows the estimated relationship in the policy on period as compared to the average of the four previous (nonpolicy on) quarters. This is taken from the estimated models with controls in Table 4 7 Or alternatively one can think of the estimates as difference-in-difference estimates of the change model (i.e. double-differenced in changes rather than triple-differenced in levels). As such they compare the relationship between changes in crime and the initial at risk proportion in the treatment period surrounding JSA introduction with the same relationship in the earlier (non-JSA) control periods. 8 The coefficient on the level, corresponding to the pre-policy baseline period, was estimated as .02 (standard error = .33) for the column (1) property crime specification and .13 (.46) for the column (4) violent crime specification.
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(specifications (2) and (5)). The shift in the slope from no relationship to a significant positive association is very clear.
The nature of the data, on the same areas followed through time, means that one can also adopt an even more stringent test by including area-specific trends in the estimating equation. Specifications (3) and (6) in the final columns of the Table therefore additionally include 45 area trend variables. The coefficients are marginally reduced by this inclusion, yet the results remain robust.
Overall it seems that benchmarking against earlier time periods acts to reinforce and corroborate the findings presented before. There appears to be a stronger positive relationship between crime and the at risk proportion in the period surrounding JSA introduction. This is a robust finding and is in line with the idea that the altering of economic incentives brought about by the JSA may well have caused individuals previously on the margins to engage in crime.
Discussion
The empirical analysis shows that areas where JSA had a bigger impact of moving people off the unemployment register were areas where crime rose by more. It also shows that, rather than going into work or education/training, the outflows to 'nowhere' significantly rose in the areas where crime went up most. This, of course, is suggestive that the benefit cuts and sanctions imposed by JSA had an unexpected social cost on society by raising crime.
But the evidence, by its very nature, indirectly confirms the existence of a positive link between benefit cuts and crime as we do not have individual data on whether the people who exited the unemployment register actually turned to crime. Getting such data is extremely hard and we are not aware of any representative source of data that exists.
However, some qualitative research conducted around the time of JSA introduction 16 (Vincent, 1998) is highly suggestive of the notion that crime was high in the thinking of disallowed and sanctioned individuals. In her analysis of 'effects on attitudes and behaviour' of her 30 interviewees, Vincent (1998) reports that four out the thirty respondents (three men, one woman) expressed the feeling that after losing their benefits "they had been driven to an extremity in which crime might be their last resort". The The male respondents also expressed the sentiment that property crime was an option to obtain some income and perhaps the only alternative for them under the circumstances.
9
One of them said:
'If it hadn't been helped out by my parents… I would have had to steal because I had no food in the cupboards, I think I had a couple of cans of beans, something like that, but I know for a fact I would have had to steal. They're asking for trouble, they're asking for people to steal."
Moreover some basic statistical analysis on data extracted from the interviews of the sanctioned claimants 10 sheds some light on characteristics of those on the margins of crime participation. The individuals most likely to mention property crime as an alternative source of income are young males in urban areas. This reassuringly fits the commonly observed profiles of those more likely to engage in crime.
In addition we can make some comments on the reason why individuals were disallowed from JSA receipt. We find that the potential crime candidates are more likely to have lost their benefits for not having satisfactorily proven that they were 'actively 9 Vincent's (1998) report also highlights a general feeling of frustration or anger among the respondents. Whilst we would not want to make too much of this, work by psychologists in criminology (Dollard et al., 1939; Berkowitz, 1989) does highlight that such feelings can act as a determinant of violent crime. 10 We are grateful to Sue Middleton from the CRSP at Loughborough University for giving us access to the original transcripts of the interviews.
seeking work' or 'failed to carry out a mandatory employment programme'. Interestingly these were two areas in the monitoring of claimants' unemployment benefit entitlement that were greatly strengthened by the introduction of JSA and the accompanying Jobseeker's Agreement.
This qualitative evidence complements the statistical work and is in line with the notion that JSA introduction did, in fact, result in sanctioned and disallowed individuals turning to crime as one would expect in a model where benefit cuts can alter an individual's incentives to participate in crime.
Longer Run Impact
One feature of the JSA system is that it imposes sanctions on people who do not (1) and (2) for property crimes and (5) and (6) for violent crimes) there is some support for the notion that more JSA sanctions are associated with increases in crime. The effect is particularly strong for property crimes, but is rather imprecisely determined (with large standard errors) for violent crimes.
Since we have data for the 25 quarters following JSA introduction we can also explore whether this is a long lasting crime effect, or if there are temporal variations, particularly if any decay effect sets in once individuals learn and become accustomised to the new benefit regime. This is done in the specifications reported in the final two columns of the Table where the coefficient on the proportion sanctioned variable is allowed to differ across six periods (annual except for 1996Q4 to 1997Q4 which covers five quarters). The pattern is interesting, showing strong effects for property crime shortly after JSA introduction, with the estimated effects dying away thereafter (remaining mostly positive, but statistically insignificant).
From looking at benefit sanctions data after JSA introduction we are thus able to reconfirm the findings from the period surrounding JSA introduction, namely that there appears to be an unintended consequence of increased crime associated with the Job Seekers Allowance. Whilst the policy was successful in reducing the claimant count, the benefit cuts and sanctions that are an important part of the policy were associated with increased crime rates, at least in the period surrounding and the couple of years after its introduction.
Implications for Cost-Benefit Evaluation of JSA Introduction
On the basis of the shifts in the outflow rate, and the estimated connections with changes in crime, we have also carried out a 'back of the envelope' cost-benefit calculation to show the implications of the crime-benefits connection for evaluating the economic impact of the JSA policy. The link with crime that we have uncovered is an additional social cost that is not usually considered in economic evaluations of welfare to work programmes like JSA. Yet our evidence suggests this negative consequence of the 19 policy to be empirically important. This has general implications for evaluations of JSA type welfare to work programmes that ignore the crime link in that they will potentially over-estimate possible benefits of such policies.
Our calculations show JSA to have been a cost effective policy reform. Table 6 shows estimates of the net social benefits of JSA in the quarter following its introduction based upon two different outflow measures when we do and do not consider the link with crime. In the upper panel of the Table we estimate the net social benefit to be between £77 and £99 million. However, once we incorporate the average extra cost from the additional 7,484 property and 854 violent crimes we estimate occurred 12 , using Home
Office estimates of the social cost of crime from Brand and Price (2000) , the net social benefit falls to a range of between £55 and £77 million. Thus, if the connection with crime was not considered one would overestimate the net social benefits by somewhere between 22 and 28 percent.
This establishes that the unintended consequence of the policy, where crime also rose as people were moved off the unemployment register by JSA, appears to be empirically important. Of course, one may be interested in whether this connection with crime is a universal feature of stricter benefit regimes embodied within policy changes to welfare to work type programmes. To properly answer this important question we need more evidence looking at the implications of stricter benefit regimes for crime in different settings and this should be an issue placed firmly upon the agenda for future research.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we look at the relationship between crime and benefit cuts and sanctions using a quasi-experimental setting induced by the introduction of the Jobseekers allowance (JSA) in the UK in October 1996. We study crime rates in areas more and less affected by the policy before and after JSA introduction. In the areas more affected by JSA introduction, crime rose by more. These were also the areas with higher outflows from unemployment and particularly to people dropping off the register but not into work or onto other benefits. Studying the relation between crime and sanctions after introduction also confirms that areas where more people were sanctioned were those where crime rose by more. As such these results seem to reflect that benefit cuts and sanctions in JSA shifted people off the benefit system and raised crime.
These are important results for at least two reasons. First, they confirm that economic incentives matter for crime. We reach this conclusion in rather a different way to the usual crime literature by looking at changes before and after a policy change that induced benefit cuts and sanctions. This tends to emphasise the dynamics of the relation between crime and incentives. Second, the results show how some government policies may have unintended consequences. The results are in line with the idea that one feature of the removal of benefits, benefit cuts and sanctions, at least in the context we study, was the imposition of a social cost to society due to higher crime. Circles are proportional to the population size of the 45 areas Population weighted regression line fit through data points Slope of regression line = 3.12, standard error = .79
Quarters Surrounding JSA Introduction Notes: The regression lines are those from specification (2), including controls, in Table 4 . The gap between the slopes produces the difference-in-difference estimate of 3.11(.86) given in Table 4 . Notes: Coefficients (heteroskedastic consistent standard errors) reported. The sample size in all regressions is 45 areas. All regressions weighted by area population. The controls entered (from the Labour Force Survey matched to police force areas) were changes in the proportions of young people, ethnic minorities, 16 to 19 year olds in full time education, part-time employees, unskilled workers and workers in personnel and security services and the change in the lowest quartile wage. Note that specifications (3) and (9) and specifications (4) and (10) are respectively the same, first stage regressions. Notes: Coefficients (heteroskedastic consistent standard errors) reported. The sample size in all regressions is 45 areas. All regressions weighted by area population. The controls entered (from the Labour Force Survey matched to police force areas) were changes in the proportions of young people, ethnic minorities, 16 to 19 year olds in full time education, part-time employees, unskilled workers and workers in personnel and security services and the change in the lowest quartile wage. Note that specifications (1) and (5) and specifications (2) and (6) are respectively the same, first stage regressions. Notes: Coefficients (heteroskedastic consistent Newey-West standard errors corrected for serial correlation) reported. The sample size is 225 (45 areas over 5 quarters). All regressions weighted by population. All specifications include quarter dummies. The controls entered (from the Labour Force Survey matched to police force areas) were changes in the proportions of young people, ethnic minorities, 16 to 19 year olds in full time education, part-time employees, unskilled workers and workers in personnel and security services and the change in lowest quartile wage. or an extra £48 applied to all outflow; ecosts of erroneous benefit payments due to computer system problems ; f -diminution in benefits from reduction to 6 months (from 12); g -average weekly benefit payment of £50 giving £650 saving per quarter for each extra outflow; h -average costs of crime computed from Brand and Price (2000) .
